The European Court of Human Rights announced its decision on July 15, 2025, in the case of Giorgi Mzhavanadze and Nodar Rukhadze v. Georgia.
The case concerns activists Giorgi Mzhavanadze (the first applicant) and Nodar Rukhadze (second applicant), who were detained during a demonstration in Tbilisi on November 9, 2020, and subsequently found guilty of administrative offences under Articles 166 and 173 of the Code of Administrative Offences of Georgia, which encompass disobedience to police orders and minor hooliganism. The national court sentenced the first applicant to three days' administrative detention, while the second applicant was fined 1,500 GEL.
The European Court of Human Rights found violations of Article 11 (freedom of assembly) of the Convention in respect of both applicants, as well as a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention concerning the second applicant.
The European Court's decision is particularly significant insofar as it provided important clarifications regarding Convention-protected rights.
Regarding the second applicant, the Court noted that apart from a police officer's testimony, no other evidence existed in the case; accordingly, it found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. The problem was compounded by the fact that body-worn cameras were not functioning or switched on at the moment of the applicant's arrest. The Court did not consider it appropriate for the national court to base its conviction solely on the testimony of a police officer who simultaneously represented the accusing party. No additional evidence existed in the case, such as video recordings. The European Court emphatically noted that the purpose of body-worn cameras is precisely to capture those circumstances that may later become subject to dispute. In the second applicant's case, however, the video recording only depicted the period following his arrest. Consequently, all these circumstances put the second applicant in a position where he had to prove his own innocence regarding the police officer's accusations, in the absence of any evidence other than the accusing party's testimony.
The Court's reasoning regarding the right to a fair trial is significant because it once again underscores how fundamental the protection of detained persons' rights during proceedings is, particularly when there is no evidence to substantiate their alleged wrongdoing. The Court again emphasized that a person's conviction cannot rely solely on police testimony in the absence of other evidence. Given this case, according greater weight to police testimony and shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to the applicant places the latter in an unequal position compared to the prosecuting party.
Furthermore, the malpractice of police officers' use of body-worn cameras is particularly noteworthy. Especially during administrative detentions, body-worn cameras are predominantly not activated. Consequently, there is no video evidence reflecting persons' arrests, which would meticulously document their alleged wrongdoing and the moment of arrest.
Thus, the European Court's reasoning regarding Article 6 clarifies that considering only police officers' testimony is insufficient, and accusations against a person must be substantiated by other evidence. A court's finding of guilt must be based solely on a coherent, clear, and convincing body of evidence that proves the person's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such a body of evidence, lower courts' adoption of legally deficient decisions violates individuals' fundamental right to a fair trial.
Notably, the European Court found violations of freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 of the Convention) in respect of both applicants. The Court explained that while any demonstration in a public place may cause a certain degree of disruption to ordinary life, this fact alone does not justify interference with the right to freedom of assembly, as it is important for authorities to show a certain “degree of tolerance.” Regarding the applicants, the European Court noted that there was no evidence in the case indicating any intentional actions by the applicants that obstructed vehicular traffic beyond the police car in question. In this regard, the Court concluded that the applicants' actions fell within the scope of freedom of assembly.
Particularly significant is the European Court's clarification that any sanction, detention, imprisonment, fine, or other measure may have a "chilling effect" on future demonstrations and individuals' exercise of their rights and freedoms. According to the European Court's conclusion, the nature and severity of imposed penalties are factors that must be considered when assessing the proportionality of interference in relation to its purpose.
Accordingly, the Court found violations of Article 11 of the Convention in respect of both applicants, concluding that there was no necessity for interfering with their exercise of freedom of assembly, and that the sanctions used against them carried a "chilling effect" on the exercise of this right, and were neither necessary nor proportionate.
The European Court's clarifications regarding the exercise of freedom of assembly and expression are particularly significant given the existing reality, as it is evident that the malpractice of administrative arrests and fines against demonstrators represents one of the most powerful tools for silencing critical voices in the country and intimidating civil society. State authorities not only fail to show the necessary "degree of tolerance" to protect freedom of assembly and expression, but purposefully impose disproportionate fines on individuals and subject them to prolonged administrative detention.
The aforementioned European Court decision serves as yet another reminder that human rights and freedoms are valuable assets in a democratic state, and respect for these rights is essential and important for the development and strengthening of civil society, which, in turn, is the foundation of a strong state.
